Liber de causis, proposition 4

prop 138 · creuzer page 204-206

PropositionΠάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς θείας ἰδιότητος, ἐκθεουμένων, πρώτιστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀκρότατον τὸ ὄν.

PropositionOf all the things that participate in the divine distinctive property and are thereby made gods, being is the very first and the highest.

Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἐπέκεινα τὸ ὄν, ὡς δέδεικται, εἴπερ πλείστων τοῦτο, μετὰ τὸ ἕν, αἴτιον, ἀκρότατον ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἑνικώτερον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως σεμνότερον. ἄλλο δὲ πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι πλὴν τοῦ ἑνός. πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἑνιαίου πλήθους τί ἄλλο, ἢ τὸ ἕν; πλῆθος δὲ ἑνιαῖον τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἐκ πέρατος ὂν καὶ ἀπείρου· καὶ ὅλως πρὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ὑπερούσιον ὄν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα ἐλλάμψεσι μόνον τὸ ἓν ἐπέκεινα φθάνει τοῦ ὄντος· τὸ δὲ ὂν εὐθὺς κατὰ τὸ ἕν. Τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὄν, οὔπω δὲ ὄν, ἕν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν· καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν. Καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἐπέκεινα εὐθὺς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς κρεῖττον τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ ἕν.

For if being is beyond both intellect and life, as has been shown, then, since it is the cause of the most things after the One, being would be the highest; for it is more unitary than these, and for that reason in every way more venerable. And there is nothing else before it except the One. For what else is before a unified manifold but the One? And being is a unified manifold, since it is composed of limit and the unlimited; and in general what is beyond essence is before essence. For in the irradiations into secondary things as well, the One alone reaches beyond being, while being comes immediately after the One. For what is potentially being, but not yet being, is one according to its own nature; and what comes after this is already being in actuality. And so among the principles too, immediately beyond being stands not-being, as better than being, and one.

The source of LdC 4, prima rerum creatarum est esse. Bardenhewer's text prints ἐνθεουμένων; the printed page reads ἐκθεουμένων, which is followed here (it is also the sense the argument needs). Pairs with El. 89 (ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου), which this proposition restates and which Thomas cites at the same place. (a) The English follows ἐκθεουμένων ('are made gods'), not Bardenhewer's printed ἐνθεουμένων. (b) πλῆθος is 'manifold' throughout, matching the register's own model sentence. (c) καὶ ὅλως πρὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ὑπερούσιον ὄν is genuinely ambiguous: ὄν may be the copula-participle ('what is beyond essence is before essence') or the substantive ('the being that is beyond essence is before essence'). The English takes the first, which is what the surrounding argument about the One and being requires; the second is defensible. (d) The clause ὡς ἐκ πέρατος ὂν καὶ ἀπείρου repeats El. 89's lemma, and the English repeats El. 89's English so the pairing Aquinas makes at LdC 4 is visible.

Numbered ρλη΄ in Creuzer's edition. · Three more apparatus notes for this proposition, on pp.204 and 206, have not yet been transcribed.

prop 70 · creuzer page 108-110

PropositionΠᾶν τὸ ὁλικώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικοῖς, καὶ πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν εἰς τὰ μετέχοντα ἐλλάμπει· καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν.

PropositionEverything that is more universal among the originative principles irradiates the things that participate in it before the more particular principles do; and it leaves what has participated later than they do.

Καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται πρὸ τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐκείνου παρουσίᾳ πάρεστι. καὶ ἐκείνου μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦντος ἔτι πάρεστι καὶ ἐνεργεῖ τὸ αἰτιώτερον· καὶ οὐκ ἐν διαφόροις μόνοις ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ποτὲ μετεχόντων. Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔτι ἔστιν ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως· ζῷον δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔμπνεον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον· καὶ τοῦ ζῆν πάλιν ἀπολιπόντος μένει τὸ ὄν· εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως. Αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι δραστικώτερον ὑπάρχον τὸ αἰτιώτερον, πρότερον εἰς τὸ μετέχον ἐνεργεῖ. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου προτέρου πάσχει· καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου πάλιν ἐνεργοῦντος κἀκεῖνο συνεργεῖ. Διότι πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν ποιῇ τὸ δεύτερον, συναπογεννᾷ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ αἰτιώτερον. Καὶ ἀπολιπόντος ἐκείνου τοῦτο ἔτι πάρεστιν. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου μετάδοσις, δρῶσα μειζόνως, ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῆς τοῦ δευτέρου μεταδόσεως τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔλλαμψιν ἐδυνάμωσεν.

For it begins its activity toward secondary things before that which comes after it does, and it is present along with that thing's presence; and when that thing is no longer acting, the more causal is still present and still acts. And this not only in different subjects, but in each single one of the things that participate at any time. For a thing must (to take an example) first come to be being, then a living thing, then a human being. And when the rational power has departed it is no longer a human being, though it is a living thing, breathing and perceiving; and when life in turn has departed, being remains: for when it does not live, to be is still present. It is the same in every case. The reason is that the more causal, being more effective, acts upon the participant first. For the same thing is acted upon first by the more powerful; and when the secondary in its turn acts, the more causal works along with it, because whatever the secondary makes, the more causal joins in generating it. And when the secondary has departed, the more causal is still present. For the imparting of the more powerful, since it acts in greater measure, leaves what has participated later. Indeed it was through the imparting of the secondary that it strengthened its own irradiation.

THE key ancestor for LdC 1. The being/living/human sequence here (Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον ... ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως) is what LdC 1 develops as 'oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde uiuum, postea homo ... quando remoues uirtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet uiuum, spirans, sensibile'. Bardenhewer adds 70 to Thomas's 56+57 precisely for this. Bardenhewer quotes the lemma as πρὸ τῶν μεριστῶν; the printed text reads πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν, which is followed here. Creuzer's note (4) cross-refers Dionysius, De divinis nominibus V.5 — a ready-made bridge to a later thread. (a) The lemma's last clause as Creuzer prints it — καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν — will not construe; the English follows the sense the proof's own closing sentence supplies (ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει), 'and it leaves what has participated later than they do', and the Greek is left exactly as printed. (b) The English holds the LdC 1 chain word for word: ὄν / esse = 'being', ζῷον / uiuum = 'a living thing', ἄνθρωπος / homo = 'a human being', λογικὴ δύναμις / uirtus rationalis = 'the rational power'. ζῷον is therefore 'a living thing' and not 'an animal' here, because LdC 1 uses uiuum for this member of the sequence and keeps animal for a separate step of its own argument. (c) εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι is printed without an apodosis; rendered as the flat statement the argument needs.

Numbered ο΄ in Creuzer's edition. · The apparatus for this proposition's continuation on p.110 has not yet been transcribed.

prop 87 · creuzer page 132

PropositionΠᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὂν αἰώνιον.

PropositionEverything eternal is being, but not every being is eternal.

καὶ γὰρ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὑπάρχει πως τοῦ ὄντος μέθεξις, καθ᾽ ὅσον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ὄν, ἔστι πως ὄν. Τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον οὐδαμῇ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὑπάρχει, καὶ μάλισθ᾽ ὅσα μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον τὸν ὅλον ἀϊδιότητος μετείληφεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ἀεί ἐστι. Μετέχει γὰρ αἰῶνος, ὃς τὸ ἀεί τι εἶναι δίδωσιν, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἂν μετέχηται. Τὸ ἄρα ὂν ὑπὸ πλειόνων μετέχεται, ἢ ὁ αἰών. ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸ ὄν. οἷς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ αἰῶνος μέτεστι, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος· οἷς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος, οὐ πᾶσι καὶ αἰῶνος.

For even things that come to be have in some way a participation in being, in so far as they are not what is in no way being; and if what comes to be is not in no way being, then it is in some way being. But the eternal belongs in no way to things that come to be, and least of all to those that have not even shared in everlastingness through the whole of time. And indeed everything eternal always is. For it participates in eternity, which gives always to be to whatever participates in it. Being, then, is participated in by more things than eternity is. Being, therefore, is beyond eternity. For the things that have a share in eternity have a share in being as well; but not all the things that have a share in being have a share in eternity too.

Source of LdC 2's proof that the first cause stands above eternity. Bardenhewer: 'Der Beweis für die Stellung der ersten Ursache vor und über der Ewigkeit ... findet sich in dem Lehrbuche § 87.' The operative clause is ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸ ὄν. Creuzer's note (4) on the facing proposition gathers the whole doxography for this argument (Plato Phileb.; Arist. Metaph. X.10; Plotinus; Porphyry Sent. 33 and 36; Proclus Theol. Plat. II.1). Deliberate glossary departure. The glossary fixes ἀΐδιος as 'eternal', but this proposition turns on Proclus's distinction between αἰών / αἰώνιος (timeless eternity) and ἀϊδιότης (perpetuity through the whole of time). 'Eternal' and 'eternity' are therefore reserved here for the αἰών family, and ἀϊδιότης is rendered 'everlastingness' — the glossary's own reading for Latin sempiternus. Collapsing the two would destroy the argument that being is beyond eternity, which is the sentence LdC 2 is built on.

Numbered πζ΄ in Creuzer's edition.

prop bardenhewer 4 · pattin prop 4 · bardenhewer page 65-69

انّ اوّل الاشياء المبتدعة الانّيّة وليس من ورائها مبتدع آخر وذلك انّ الانّيّة فوق الحسّ وفوق النفس وفوق العقل وليس بعد العلّة الاولى اوسع ولا اكثر معلولات منها ولذلك صارت اعلا الاشياء المبتدعة كلّها واشدّها اتّحادا وانّما صارت كذلك لقربها من الانّيّة المحضة الواحد الحقّ الذى ليس فيه كثرة من الجهات الاشخاص والانّيّة المبتدعة وان كانت واحدة فانّها تتكثّر اعنى انّها تقبل الكثير وانّما صارت كثيرة لانّها وان كانت بسيطة وليس فى المبتدعات ابسط منها فانّها مركّبة من نهاية ولانهاية وذلك انّ كلّ ما كان منها يلى العلّة الاولى فهو عقل تامّ كامل فى غاية القوّة وسائر الفضائل والصور العقليّة فيه اوسع واشدّ كلّيّة والاسفل منه فهو عقل ايضا الّا انّه دون ذلك العقل فى التمام والقوّة والفضائل وليست الصور العقليّة فيه اوسع كسعتها فى ذلك العقل والانّيّة المبتدعة الاولى عقل كلّها الّا انّ العقل فيها مختلف بالنوع الذى ذكرنا فلمّا اختلف العقل صار هناك صور عقليّة مختلفة وكما ان الصورة الواحدة اذا اختلفت فى العالم السفلىّ حدث منها اشخاص لا نهاية لها فى الكثرة كذلك الانّيّة الاولى المبتدعة لمّا اختلفت ظهر الصور التى لا نهاية لها الّا انّها وان اختلفت فانّها لا تتباين بعضها من بعض كمباينة الاشخاص وذلك انّها تتّحد من غير تفاسد وتنفرق من غير تباين لانّها واحد ذات كثرة وكثرة وحدانيّة والعقول الأوّل تفيض على العقول الثوانى الفضائل التى تنال من العلّة الاولى وتسلك الفضائل فيها الى ان تبلغ آخرها والعقول العالية الاول التى تلى العلّة الاولى تؤثّر الصور الثابتة القائمة التى لا تدثر فيحتاج الى إعادتها مرّة آخرة وامّا العقول الثوانى فتؤثّر الصور المائلة الزائلة كما هى النفس فانّها من تأثير العقول الثوانى التى تلى الانّيّة المبتدعة سفلا وانّما كثرت الانفس بالنوع الذى به تكثّرت العقول وذلك انّ انّيّة النفس ايضا ذات نهاية وما كان منها سفلا فغير متناهٍ فالانفس التى تلى العقل تامّة كاملة قليلة الميل والزوال والانفس التى تلى الانّيّة سفلا هى فى التمام والكمال دون الانفس العالية والانفس العالية تفيض بالفضائل التى تقبل من العقل على الانفس السفليّة وكلّ نفس تقبل من العقل قوّة اكثر فهى على التأثير اقوى ويكون المؤثّر منها ثابتا باقيا ويكون حركته حركةً مستديرة متّصلة وما كان منها قوّة العقل فيه اقلّ يكون فى التأثير دون الانفس الاول ويكون المؤثّر منها ضعيفا مستحيلا داثرا الّا انّه وان كان كذلك فانّه يدوم بالكون فقد استبان لم صارت الصور العقليّة كثيرة وانّما هى انّيّة واحدة مبسوطة ولم صارت الانفس كثيرة بعضها اقوى من بعض وانّيّتها واحدة مبسوطة لا خلاف فيها

The first of created things is being, and there is no other created thing before it. That is because being is above sense and above soul and above intellect, and after the first cause there is nothing wider than it nor with more things caused by it. For that reason it came to be the highest of all created things and the most strongly unified. And it came to be so only because of its nearness to the pure being, the true One, in which there is no multiplicity of the aspects of individuals. Created being, although it is one, is yet multiplied — I mean that it receives the many. And it came to be many only because, although it is simple, and there is nothing among created things simpler than it, it is composed of the finite and the infinite. For everything among them that is next to the first cause is a complete and perfect intellect, at the utmost of power, and the other excellences, and the intellectual forms in it are wider and more strongly universal; and what is lower than it is intellect also, except that it is below that intellect in completeness and power and the excellences, and the intellectual forms in it are not as wide as their width in that intellect. And created being, the first, is all of it intellect, except that intellect in it differs in the manner we have mentioned. And when intellect differed, there came to be there differing intellectual forms. And just as the one form, when it differs in the lower world, individuals without end in multitude arise from it, so the first created being, when it differed, the forms which have no end appeared — except that they, although they differ, are not distinct one from another as individuals are distinct; that is because they are united without corruption and are separated without distinction, because they are one that has multiplicity, and a multiplicity that has unity. And the first intellects pour upon the second intellects the excellences they receive from the first cause, and the excellences pass through them until they reach the last of them. And the high first intellects, which are next to the first cause, effect the fixed abiding forms which do not pass away, so as to need to be made over again; but the second intellects effect the inclining, passing forms, such as soul is, for soul is from the effect of the second intellects which are next to created being, below. And souls came to be many only in the manner in which intellects came to be many; that is because the being of soul also has an end, and what of it is lower is without end. So the souls which are next to intellect are complete and perfect, of little inclination and passing away; and the souls which are next to being, below, are below the high souls in completeness and perfection. And the high souls pour upon the lower souls the excellences they receive from intellect. And every soul that receives more power from intellect is stronger upon its effect, and what it effects is fixed and abiding, and its motion is a continuous circular motion. And what of them has less of the power of intellect in it is below the first souls in its effect, and what it effects is weak, alterable, passing away — except that, though it be so, it endures by coming to be. It has now become clear why the intellectual forms came to be many, though being is one and simple; and why souls came to be many, some stronger than others, though their being is one and simple, with no difference in it.

Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).