Liber de causis, proposition 5

prop 123 · creuzer page 182-184

PropositionΠᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν ἄρρητόν ἐστι καὶ ἄγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ληπτόν ἐστι καὶ γνωστόν.

PropositionEverything divine is in itself, because of its unification beyond essence, ineffable and unknowable to all secondary things; but from the things that participate in it, it is apprehensible and knowable.

Διὸ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον παντελῶς ἄγνωστον, ἅτε ἀμέθεκτον ὄν. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν. Καὶ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐφάπτεται, καὶ ἐν νοήσεσιν ὑφέστηκεν· οἱ δὲ θεοὶ πάντων εἰσὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων. Οὔτε οὖν δοξαστὸν τὸ θεῖον, οὔτε διανοητόν, οὔτε νοητόν. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ἢ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοξαστόν, ἢ ὄντως ὄν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν, ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, ὂν ἅμα καὶ γεννητόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διανοητόν. Εἰ οὖν οἱ θεοὶ ὑπερούσιοι καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων ὑφεστήκασιν, οὔτε δόξα ἔστιν αὐτῶν, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, οὔτε νόησις. Ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξηρτημένων, οἷαί πέρ εἰσιν αὐτῶν αἱ ἰδιότητες, γνωρίζονται, καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαίως. Κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν μετεχομένων ἰδιότητας καὶ αἱ τῶν μετεχόντων συνδιαιροῦνται διαφορότητες. Καὶ οὔτε πᾶν μετέχει παντὸς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνταξις τῶν πάντῃ ἀνομοίων) οὔτε τὸ τυχὸν τοῦ τυχόντος μετέχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑκάστῳ συνῆπται, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου πρόεισιν.

Therefore only the first is wholly unknowable, since it is unparticipated. For all knowledge that comes through reason is of beings, and it has its power of apprehending truth in the beings. For it lays hold of objects of thought and has its hypostasis in acts of thinking; but the gods are beyond all beings. The divine, then, is not an object of opinion, nor of discursive thought, nor of intellection. For every being is either perceptible, and for that reason an object of opinion; or truly being, and for that reason an object of intellection; or between these, at once being and generated, and for that reason an object of discursive thought. If, then, the gods are beyond essence and have their hypostasis before beings, there is no opinion of them, nor knowledge and discursive thought, nor intellection. But they are known from the things that depend on them, according to what their distinctive properties are; and this necessarily. For it is according to the distinctive properties of the things participated that the differences of the things participating are divided along with them. And neither does everything participate in everything (for there is no ordering together of things wholly unlike), nor does any chance thing participate in any chance thing; rather, what is akin to each is joined to it and proceeds from it.

Source of LdC 5 (the first cause above every name, knowable only through its effect). Two readings Bardenhewer disputes are confirmed here as Creuzer's text with codex A against him: Creuzer prints τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν where Bardenhewer would read τῆς οὐσίας (Creuzer's note 5 records A's οὐσίας), and Creuzer prints καὶ διάνοια where Bardenhewer would read ἡ διάνοια (note 7). Both are edition-level variants, flagged in the apparatus rather than silently chosen. Two edition-level variants translated AS PRINTED, not emended. (a) Creuzer prints ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν, rendered 'it has its power of apprehending truth in the beings'; codex A reads τῆς οὐσίας (Creuzer's note 5), which would give 'of essence' and is the reading Bardenhewer prefers. The English follows Creuzer. (b) Creuzer prints οὔτε ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, rendered 'nor knowledge and discursive thought'; Bardenhewer would read ἡ διάνοια (Creuzer's note 7). Neither variant is silently adopted. ὑπερούσιος is 'beyond essence', holding οὐσία = 'essence' across the Greek units.

Numbered ρκγ΄ in Creuzer's edition.

prop bardenhewer 5 · pattin prop 5 · bardenhewer page 69-71

انّ العلّة الاولى اعلا من الصفة وانّما عجزت الالسن عن صفتها من اجل وصف انّيّتها لانّها فوق كلّ علّة واحدة وانّما وصفت بالعلل الثوانى التى استنارت من نور العلّة الاولى وذلك انّ العلّة التى تنير تنير اوّلا تنير معلولها وهى لا تستنير من نور آخر لانّها هى النور المحض الذى ليس فوقه نور فمن ذلك صار الاوّل وحده يفوت الصفة وانّما كان كذلك لانّه ليس فوقه علّة يُعرف بها وكلّ شىء انّما يعرف ويوصف من تلقاء علّته فاذا كان الشىء علّةً فقط وليس بمعلولٍ لم يعلم بعلّة اولى ولا يوصف لانّه اعلى من الصفة وليس يبلغه المنطق وذلك انّ الصفة انّما تكون بالمنطق والمنطق بالعقل والعقل بالفكر والفكر بالوهم والوهم بالحواسّ والعلّة الاولى فوق الاشياء كلّها لانّها علّة لها فلذلك صارت لا تقع تحت الحسّ والوهم والفكر والعقل والمنطق فليست اذا بموصوفة واقول ايضا انّ الشىء امّا ان يكون محسوسا فيقع تحت الحواسّ وامّا ان يكون متوهّما فيقع تحت الوهم وامّا ان يكون ثابتا قائما على حال واحدة لا يتغيّر فيكون معقولا وامّا ان يكون متغيّرا داثرا واقعا تحت الكون والفساد فيكون واقعا تحت الفكرة والعلّة الاولى فوق الاشياء العقليّة الدائمة وفوق الاشياء الداثرة ولذلك لا يقع عليها الحواسّ ولا الوهم ولا الفكرة ولا العقل وانّما يُستدلّ عليها من العلّة الثانية وهى العقل وانّما تسمّى باسم معلولها الاوّل بنوع ارفع وافضل لانّ الذى المعلول هو العلّة ايضا الّا انّه بنوع ارفع وافضل واكرم كما بيّنّا

The first cause is higher than description. Tongues fall short of describing it only because of describing its being, since that being is above every single cause, and it is described only through the second causes, which are illumined by the light of the first cause. That is because the cause which illumines illumines first the thing it causes, and it is not illumined by another light, because it is the pure light above which there is no light. For that reason the first alone came to escape description. And it is so only because there is no cause above it by which it may be known, and everything is known and described only from the side of its cause. So when the thing is a cause only, and is not caused, it is not known by a first cause and is not described, because it is higher than description, and speech does not reach it. That is because description comes about by speech, and speech by intellect, and intellect by thought, and thought by imagination, and imagination by the senses. But the first cause is above all things, because it is a cause to them; and for that reason it came to be that it does not fall under sense, nor imagination, nor thought, nor intellect, nor speech, and so it is not described. And I say also that a thing is either perceptible, and so falls under the senses; or imagined, and so falls under imagination; or fixed and standing in one state, not changing, and so is intelligible; or changing, passing away, falling under coming-to-be and corruption, and so falls under thought. But the first cause is above the everlasting intellectual things and above the things that pass away, and therefore the senses do not light upon it, nor imagination, nor thought, nor intellect. It is inferred only from the second cause, which is intellect. And it is named by the name of the thing it first causes, but in a higher and more excellent way; because what is caused is a cause also, but in a higher and more excellent and nobler way, as we have set out.

Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).