Liber de causis, proposition 6

prop 171 · creuzer page 254

PropositionΠᾶς νοῦς ἀμέριστός ἐστιν οὐσία.

PropositionEvery intellect is an undivided essence.

εἰ γὰρ ἀμεγέθης καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἀμέριστόν ἐστι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μεριστόν, ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος, ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ μεριστὸν ἐν χρόνῳ φερομένας· ὁ δὲ νοῦς κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιος, καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωμάτων, καὶ ἥνωται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πλῆθος. Ἀμέριστος ἄρα ἐστίν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀσώματος ὁ νοῦς, ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστροφὴ δηλοῖ. τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων οὐδὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφεται. Ὅτι δὲ αἰώνιος ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας ταυτότης πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν· οὕτω γὰρ δέδεικται πρότερον. Ὅτι δὲ ἥνωται τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἑνάδας τὰς θείας τοῦ νοεροῦ πλήθους συνέχεια. Αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι πρῶτον πλῆθος· οἱ δὲ νόες μετ᾽ ἐκείνας.

For if it is without magnitude, and incorporeal, and unmoved, it is undivided. For everything that is divided in any way at all is divided either according to magnitude, or according to multiplicity, or according to its activities as these are borne along in time; but intellect is in every respect eternal, and beyond bodies, and the manifold in it is unified. It is therefore undivided. That intellect is incorporeal is shown by its reversion upon itself, for no body reverts upon itself. That it is eternal is shown by the identity of its activity with its essence, for this has been shown earlier. That its manifold is unified is shown by the continuity of the intellectual manifold with the divine henads. For the henads are the first manifold, and the intellects come after them.

Source of LdC 6 (Bardenhewer: '§ 6 deckt sich mit § 171 des Lehrbuches'). Creuzer's note (6) records that the printed edition had a lacuna here which he filled from codex A — as at El. 88, so the supplement must not be presented as uncontested. Note (8) quotes THOMAS TAYLOR'S 1816 English directly ('or an account of energies, which are borne along with the flux of time'), which means Creuzer's apparatus is itself a witness to the Taylor reception and can be cited on that margin. (a) Editorial supplement, do not read as uncontested text: Creuzer's note (6) reports the printed edition as reading 'καὶ ἀσώματον *** ἄν ὁπωσοῦν' and says he filled the gap from codex A. On the text as it now stands the supplement runs across the words rendered 'and unmoved, it is undivided. For everything that is divided in any way at all', and πᾶν itself ('everything') is Portus's conjecture for the edition's ἄν. Three editorial hands are therefore in that clause; the English translates it because Creuzer prints it, and the crux page says whose it is. (b) πλῆθος is 'manifold' where it names a thing (the manifold in intellect, the first manifold) but 'multiplicity' in the phrase κατὰ πλῆθος, where it names a respect of division alongside magnitude — a departure from the wording used at El. 138, made for readability. (c) νοερός is 'intellectual' here and at El. 173.

Numbered ροα΄ in Creuzer's edition.

prop bardenhewer 6 · pattin prop 6 · bardenhewer page 72-73

العقل جوهر لا يتجزّأ وذلك انّه ان كان ليس بعظم ولا بجسم ولا يتحرّك فلا محالة انّه لا يتجزّأ وايضا فانّ كلّ متجزّأ امّا ان يتجزّأ بالكثرة وامّا فى العظم وامّا فى حركته فاذا كان الشىء على هذه الحال كان تحت الزمان لانّه انّما يقبل التجزئة فى زمان وليس العقل داخلا تحت الزمان بل هو مع الدهر فلذلك صار ارفع واعلى من كلّ جسم وكلّ كثرة فان لُقيت فيه كثرة فانّما تُلقى فيه موحودة كانّها شىء واحد فاذا كان العقل على هذه الصفة لم يقبل التجزئة البتّة والدليل على ذلك رجوعه الى ذاته اعنى انّه لا يميَّز مع الشىء المميَّز فيكون احد طرفيه نابيا من الآخر وذلك انّه اذا اراد علم الشىء الجسمانىّ المميَّز مُيّز معه وهو ثابت قائم على حاله لانّه صورة لا يصيف عنها شىء وليست الاجرام كذلك والدليل ايضا على انّ العقل ليس بجرم ولا يتجزّأ جوهره وفعله فانّهما شىء واحد والعقل كثير من تلقاء الفضائل الآتية اليه من العلّة الاولى وهو وان يكثر بهذا النوع فانّه ما قرب من الواحد صار واحدا لا ينقسم والعقل لا يقبل التقسيم لانّه اوّل مُبْدَعٍ أُبدع من العلّة الاولى فالوحدانيّة أَوْلى به من الانقسام فقد وضح انّ العقل جوهر ليس بعظم ولا جسم ولا يتحرّك بنوع من انواع الحركة الجسمانيّة ولذلك صار فوق الزمان كما بيّنّا

Intellect is a substance which is not divided. That is because, if it is not a magnitude and not a body and does not move, then it cannot but be undivided. And again, everything divided is divided either in multitude, or in magnitude, or in its motion; and when a thing is in this state it is under time, because it receives division only in time. But intellect does not enter under time; rather it is with eternity, and for that reason it came to be higher and loftier than every body and every multitude. And if multitude is met with in it, it is met with there as a unity, as though it were one thing. So when intellect is in this state, it does not receive division at all. And the proof of this is its reversion upon itself — I mean that it is not distinguished along with the thing distinguished, so that one of its two extremes should be set apart from the other. That is because, when it wishes to know the corporeal distinguished thing, it is distinguished along with it, while it itself is fixed and standing in its own state, because it is a form from which nothing departs; but bodies are not so. And the proof also that intellect is not a body and that its substance is not divided is that its substance and its operation are one thing. And intellect is many from the side of the excellences that come to it from the first cause; and although it is made many in this manner, yet what is near to the One has become one and is not divided. And intellect does not receive division, because it is the first created thing brought into being from the first cause, and unity is more proper to it than division. So it has become evident that intellect is a substance which is not a magnitude and not a body and does not move with any of the kinds of bodily motion, and for that reason it came to be above time, as we have set out.

Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).