Liber de causis, proposition 8

Omnis intelligentiae fixio et essentia eius est per bonitatem puram quae est causa prima

The section that breaks the pattern. Everything else in the pilot was quarried from a proposition of Proclus; this one was not — it is the Arabic writer's own summary of the system he had been excerpting. The page is built to say that, rather than to fill the space above the text with the nearest available parallel.

What it drew on

There is none — Elements of Theology

This section has no source in the Elements of Theology. Bardenhewer says so flatly: '§ 8 findet sich in dieser Fassung in dem Lehrbuche nicht. Es ist ein kurzer Abriss des ganzen Systems unseres Buches.' The two propositions Thomas adduces here — El. 12 and El. 180 — are comparisons of his own, and stand in the side column rather than above the text. The place above the text is left empty on purpose: it is a finding, not a gap in the work done.

Bardenhewer 1882, pp. 15–25 (the section-by-section concordance)

Anonymous (Kalam fi mahd al-khair)Kalam fi mahd al-khair (Arabic Liber de causis)kalam.8translation

The Arabic parent of this section exists even though its Greek source does not: what is missing above is Proclus, not the transmission. Node only per ruling 6.

prop bardenhewer 8 · pattin prop 8 · bardenhewer page 76-79

كلّ عقل انّما ثباته وقوامه بالخير المحض وهى العلّة الاولى وقوّة العقل اشدّ وحدانيّة من الاشياء الثوانى التى بعده لانّها لا تنال معرفته وانّما صار كذلك لانّه علّة لما تحته والدليل على ذلك ما نحن ذاكرون انّ العقل مدبّر لجميع الاشياء التى تحته بالقوّة الالاهيّة التى فيه وبها يمسك الاشياء لانّه بها كان علّة الاشياء وهو يمسك جميع الاشياء التى تحته ويحيط بها وذلك انّ كلّ ما كان اوّلا لاشياء وعلّة لها فهو ماسك لتلك الاشياء ومدبّر لها ولا يفوته منها شىء من اجل قوّته العالية فالعقل اذا رئيس جميع الاشياء التى تحته وممسكها ومدبّرها كما انّ الطبيعة تدبّر الاشياء التى تحتها بقوّة العقل وكذلك العقل يدبّر الطبيعة بالقوّة الالاهيّة وانّما صار العقل يمسك الاشياء التى بعده ويدبّرها ويعلّق قوّته عليها لانّها ليست بقوّة جوهريّة له بل هى قوّة القوى الجوهريّة لانّه علّة لها والعقل يحيط بالاكوان الطبيعيّة وما فوق الطبيعة اعنى النفس فانّها فوق الطبيعة وذلك انّ الطبيعة تحيط بالكون والنفس تحيط بالطبيعة والعقل يحيط بالنفس فالعقل اذا يحيط بالاشياء كلّها وانّما صار العقل كذلك من اجل العلّة الاولى التى تعلوا الاشياء كلّها لانّها علّة العقل والنفس والطبيعة وسائر الاشياء والعلّة الاولى ليست بعقل ولا نفس ولا طبيعة بل هى فوق العقل والنفس والطبيعة لانّها مبدعة لجميع الاشياء الّا انّها مبدعة العقل بلا توسّط ومبدعة النفس والطبيعة وسائر الاشياء بتوسّط العقل والعلم الالاهىّ ليس كالعلم العقلىّ ولا كعلم النفس بل هو فوق علم العقل وعلم النفس لانّه مبدع العلوم والقوّة الالاهيّة فوق كلّ قوّة عقليّة ونفسانيّة وطبيعيّة لانّها علّة لكلّ قوّة والعقل ذو كلّيّة لانّه انّيّة وصورة وكذلك النفس ذات كلّيّة والطبيعة ذات كلّيّة وليس للعلّة الاولى كلّيّة لانّها انّيّة فقط فان قال قائل لا بدّ من ان يكون لها كلّيّة قلنا كلّيّتها لانهايتها وشخصها الخير المحض المفيض على العقل جميع الخيرات وعلى سائر الاشياء بتوسّط العقل

Every intellect has its fixity and its subsistence only through the pure good, which is the first cause. And the power of intellect is more strongly one than the second things which are after it, because they do not attain knowledge of it. And it came to be so only because it is a cause to what is below it. And the proof of this is what we now mention: that intellect governs all the things below it by the divine power that is in it, and by it holds the things fast; because by it it was the cause of the things, and it holds fast all the things below it and encompasses them. That is because everything that is first for things and a cause to them holds those things fast and governs them, and nothing of them escapes it, because of its high power. Intellect, then, is the chief of all the things below it, and their holder and their governor. And just as nature governs the things below it by the power of intellect, so intellect governs nature by the divine power. And intellect came to hold fast the things after it and to govern them and to attach its power to them, because that power is not a substantial power belonging to it; rather it is the power of the substantial powers, because it is a cause to them. And intellect encompasses the natural things that come to be, and what is above nature, I mean soul — for soul is above nature. That is because nature encompasses coming-to-be, and soul encompasses nature, and intellect encompasses soul. Intellect, then, encompasses all things. And intellect came to be so because of the first cause, which is higher than all things, because it is the cause of intellect and soul and nature and all other things. And the first cause is not intellect, nor soul, nor nature; rather it is above intellect and soul and nature, because it brings all things into being — except that it brings intellect into being without mediation, and brings soul and nature and all other things into being through the mediation of intellect. And divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor like the knowledge of soul; rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul, because it brings the kinds of knowledge into being. And the divine power is above every intellectual and soul-like and natural power, because it is the cause of every power. And intellect is a whole, because it is being and form; and likewise soul is a whole, and nature is a whole. But the first cause is not a whole, because it is being only. And if someone should say that it must have wholeness, we say: its wholeness is its infinity, and its individuality is the pure good, which pours upon intellect all good things, and upon all other things through the mediation of intellect.

Bardenhewer footnotes this section as the one Haneberg had already printed (Sitzungsberichte der k. bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1863, Bd. 1, pp. 369-370), and his apparatus records Haneberg's readings against the manuscript throughout.

Apparatus

[p.76] * Dieses Kapitel hat Haneberg in den Sitzungsberichten der k. bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Jahrg. 1863, Band 1. S. 369-370 abdrucken lassen.
[p.76] 2 فى الخير in der Handschrift für بالخير, von Haneberg beibehalten | 5 ذلك hat Haneberg ausgelassen | 6 تمسك in der Handschrift für يمسك, von Haneberg beibehalten | 7 يتمسك schreibt Haneberg unrichtig für يمسك | 8 الاشياء in der Handschrift für لاشياء, von Haneberg beibehalten
[p.77] 2 والعقل in der Handschrift für فالعقل, von Haneberg beibehalten | 4 وانّما für ... | 5 واذا schreibt Haneberg unrichtig für ويعلّق in der Handschrift
[p.78] 1 تعلوا will Haneberg ändern in تعلق | 4 العقل ist von späterer Hand abgeändert in للعقل; Haneberg العقل | 7 عقليّة ursprünglich, wie es wenigstens scheint, عليه; zwei spätere Hände stellten عقليّة ...

Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).

Edition: Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882 — Arabic text with Latin and German translation
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: proofed
Translator: Wroot Press draft
Attribution: Stated: Aristotle (in the wider doxographic tradition that also produced the Theology of Aristotle). Critical: Anonymous compiler, excerpting and paraphrasing Proclus's Elements of Theology. Bardenhewer's edition itself untangles the Kalam from any Aristotelian ascription, but the work circulated in the same Arabic doxographic environment as the (pseudo-)Aristotelian Theology and was read there as part of the Aristotelian corpus before Bardenhewer traced its propositions to Proclus.

The text

prop bardenhewer 8 · pattin prop 8 · bardenhewer page 172-173

Omnis intelligentiae fixio et essentia eius est per bonitatem puram quae est causa prima. et uirtus quidem intelligentiae est uehementioris unitatis quam res secundae quae sunt post eam, quoniam ipsae non accipiunt cognitionem eius. et non est facta ita, nisi quia causa est ei quod est sub ea. et significatio eius est illud cuius rememoramur: intelligentia est regens omnes res quae sunt sub ea per uirtutem diuinam quae est in ea, et per eam retinet res, quoniam per eam est causa rerum: et ipsa retinet omnes res quae sunt sub ea et comprehendit eas. quod est quoniam omne quod est primum rebus et causa eis est retinens illas res et regens eas, et non euadit ab eo ex ipsis aliquid propter uirtutem suam altam. ergo intelligentia est princeps omnium rerum quae sunt sub ea et retinens eas et regens eas, sicut natura regit res quae sunt sub ea per uirtutem intelligentiae. et similiter intelligentia regit naturam per uirtutem diuinam. et intelligentia quidem non facta est retinens res quae sunt post eam et regens eas et suspendens uirtutem suam super eas, nisi quoniam ipsae non sunt uirtus substantialis ei, immo ipsa est uirtus uirtutum substantialium, quoniam est causa eis. et intelligentia quidem comprehendit generata et naturam et orizontem naturae, scilicet animam: nam ipsa est supra naturam. quod est quia natura continet generationem, et anima continet naturam, et intelligentia continet animam. ergo intelligentia continet omnes res. et non est facta intelligentia ita nisi propter causam primam quae supereminet omnibus rebus. et causa quidem prima non est intelligentia neque anima neque natura, immo est supra intelligentiam et animam et naturam, quoniam est creans omnes res: uerumtamen est creans intelligentiam absque medio, et creans animam et naturam et reliquas res mediante intelligentia. et scientia quidem diuina non est sicut scientia intelligibilis neque sicut scientia animalis, immo est supra scientiam intelligentiae et scientiam animae, quoniam est creans scientias. et uirtus quidem diuina est supra omnem uirtutem intelligibilem et animalem et naturalem, quoniam est causa omni uirtuti. et intelligentia est habens helyatin et formam, et similiter anima est habens helyatin et natura est habens helyatin. et causae quidem primae non est helyatin, quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. quod si dixerit aliquis: necesse est ut sit helyatin, dicemus: helyatine id est suum est infinitum, et indiuiduum suum est bonitas pura, effluens super intelligentiam omnes bonitates et super reliquas res mediante intelligentia.

The fixity of every intellect and its essence is through the pure goodness which is the first cause. And the power of intellect is of a stronger unity than the second things which are after it, since they do not receive knowledge of it. And it was not made so except because it is a cause to what is below it. And the sign of it is what we call to mind: intellect rules all the things which are below it by the divine power which is in it, and through that power it holds things fast, since through it intellect is the cause of things; and it holds fast all the things which are below it and embraces them. This is because everything that is first to things and a cause to them holds those things fast and rules them, and nothing of them escapes it, because of its high power. Therefore intellect is the ruler of all the things which are below it, holding them fast and ruling them, just as nature rules the things which are below it by the power of intellect. And likewise intellect rules nature by the divine power. And intellect was not made to hold fast the things which are after it, and to rule them, and to hang its power over them, except because they are not a substantial power to it; rather it is the power of the substantial powers, since it is a cause to them. And intellect embraces the things generated, and nature, and the horizon of nature, that is, soul; for intellect is above nature. This is because nature contains generation, and soul contains nature, and intellect contains soul. Therefore intellect contains all things. And intellect was not made so except on account of the first cause, which is exalted above all things. And the first cause is not intellect, nor soul, nor nature; rather it is above intellect and soul and nature, since it is the creator of all things — yet it creates intellect without a mean, and creates soul and nature and the remaining things by the mediation of intellect. And divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor like the knowledge of soul; rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul, since it creates the kinds of knowledge. And the divine power is above every intellectual power and every power of soul and every natural power, since it is a cause to every power. And intellect has helyatin and form; and likewise soul has helyatin, and nature has helyatin. But the first cause has no helyatin, since it is being only. And if anyone should say that it must have helyatin, we shall say: its helyatin, that is, its own, is infinite, and its individual is pure goodness, flowing out upon intellect with all the goodnesses, and upon the remaining things by the mediation of intellect.

This section has no source in the Elements — Bardenhewer states so flatly. El. 12 and El. 180 are Aquinas's own comparanda, not sources he identifies. The transliterated term 'helyatin' (Arabic hayūlā, matter) is spelled consistently here as 'helyatin', not the variants 'heleatin' or 'heliatim' that appear elsewhere in the tradition; Bardenhewer devotes pp. 247–274 to the word's textual history. The English was made from the Latin alone, with no Greek text consulted and nothing in the wording chosen to echo a Proclus proposition. Beyond that: (a) scientia animalis is 'the knowledge of soul', from anima, not from animal — the same trap as operatio animalis at LdC 3; uirtus animalis likewise 'power of soul'. (b) intelligibilis follows the rule stated at LdC 7: 'intellectual' for what belongs to intelligentia, 'intelligible' for objects of intellect. (c) helyatin is left exactly as the text transliterates it (Arabic hayula, matter); no English equivalent is imposed here. (d) The closing sentence, 'helyatine id est suum est infinitum, et indiuiduum suum est bonitas pura', will not construe cleanly as printed; it is translated word for word and flagged rather than repaired. (e) esse tantum is 'being only', matching esse = 'being' across LdC 1 and 4.

Apparatus

(1) [p.172] 3 prima causa b β
(2) [p.172] 3—4 uehementioris unitatis est b β
(3) [p.172] 5 quoniam non accipiunt ipsae eam. et a ‖ eius fehlt b β ‖ facta est b β
(4) [p.172] 6 causa fehlt a ‖ quae für quod b α β ‖ quia für et a b α β
(5) [p.172] 7 memoramur a: rememorandum b β
(6) [p.172] 9 continet für das erste retinet b β
(7) [p.172] 10 res fehlt a ‖ sub ea sunt β ‖ quod für quoniam a
(8) [p.172] 10—11 quoniam est omne β
(9) [p.172] 11 principium α
(10) [p.172] 12 ea für eo α ‖ euadit ab ipsis b β
(11) [p.172] 13 alteram α: uel causam b β ‖ omnium fehlt α ‖ rerum fehlt b β
(12) [p.172] 14 sub ea sunt b β ‖ ea für eas b β ‖ et regens eas fehlt b β
(13) [p.172] 15 sub ea sunt b β ‖ secundum für per b β ‖ quia für et a α
(14) [p.172] 16 regit fehlt b β ‖ quia für et a α
(15) [p.172] 17 retinens quae facta sunt post esse et b β
(16) [p.172] 18 quis für suam b β ‖ ipsae res α: ipsa a b: quia β ‖ non fehlt b β ‖ non sunt fehlt a
(17) [p.172] 19 uirtutis β ‖ eis b α β ‖ est ipsa b
(18) [p.172] 20 quia für et a α: unde b β ‖ quidem fehlt b β
(19) [p.172] 22 continet natura β
(20) [p.172] 23 et fehlt b β
(21) [p.172] 24 continet fehlt a α
(22) [p.172] 25 primam fehlt a ‖ superueniet a α ‖ rebus, quoniam est causa intelligentiae et animae et naturae et reliquis rebus. quia causa a α
(23) [p.173] 2 immo fehlt α ‖ super b β ‖ das erste et fehlt b β ‖ quae für quoniam b β
(24) [p.173] 3 ut für uerumtamen α ‖ operans a α
(25) [p.173] 4 eas für res b
(26) [p.173] 6 sicut fehlt a α
(27) [p.173] 6—7 scientiam animae et intelligentiae b β
(28) [p.173] 7 scientiam α
(29) [p.173] 7—8 quia quidem uirtus a α: et uirtus quoque b β
(30) [p.173] 9 naturalem. est (et b) enim b β
(31) [p.173] 10 heleatin a ‖ quia für das zweite et a ‖ animam b ‖ est fehlt a
(32) [p.173] 11 heliatim a
(33) [p.173] 11—12 helyatin. et . . . non est fehlt a b α β
(34) [p.173] 13 dicerent aliqui b β ‖ heliatim a ‖ heletine a: helecine α
(35) [p.173] 14 quia für et a α ‖ bonitas est β
(36) [p.173] 14—15 pura et effluens a
(37) [p.173] 15 influens b β ‖ intelligentias b β
(38) [p.173] 16 ea für intelligentia α ‖ mediante intelligentia fehlt a

Edition: Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: none
Translator: Wroot Press draft

What drew on it

Not yet looked for

No block of Albert's De causis et processu universitatis has been located for this section. Albert restructures the material rather than glossing it lemma by lemma, so a parallel may exist that a lemma-by-lemma search would not find; this has not been searched for further.

Albert's blocks located so far correspond to sections 1, 3 and 5 only.

Thomas AquinasSuper Librum de causislectio IX (Parma vol. 21)commentarynode only

Aquinas's Lectio IX expounds this section — his lectio numbering runs one ahead of Bardenhewer's §§ from Lectio VI on, because his Lectio IV and V divide what Bardenhewer prints as a single § 4. His text spells the transliterated Arabic term 'ylcachim' where Bardenhewer prints 'helyatin'. Node only per ruling 9: this lectio is OCR, not plate-verified.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Parma, Parma, 1852-1873 — Opera omnia (Parma/Vives)
Digital base: Saffrey 1954 base text (Corpus Thomisticum); Parma/Vives 19th-c. text is the actual PD ingestion source (Corpus Thomisticum, finding aid only, not embedded [ruling 5])
OCR status: none

Set beside it

ProclusElements of Theologyel.12comparison

Not a source. Thomas sets this proposition beside the section's FIRST SENTENCE only (Bardenhewer: 'Zu dem ersten Satze vergleicht Thomas die 12. These des Lehrbuches'), which is why it is printed beside the text and not above it.

prop 12 · creuzer page 20-22

PropositionΠάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία πρωτίστη τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν.

PropositionOf all beings the principle and the very first cause is the Good.

Εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς αἰτίας πάντα πρόεισιν, ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν ἢ τἀγαθὸν χρὴ λέγειν ἢ τἀγαθοῦ κρεῖττον. Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν κρείττων ἐκείνη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πότερον ἥκει τι καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐδέν; καὶ εἰ μὲν μηδέν, ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι φυλάττοιμεν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰτίας τάξει· δέον πανταχοῦ παρεῖναί τι τοῖς αἰτίοις ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας, καὶ διαφερόντως ἐκ τῆς πρωτίσης, ἐξ ἧς πάντα ἐξήρτηται, καὶ δι᾽ ἣν ἔστιν ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων. Εἰ δὲ ἔστι μετουσία κἀκείνοις τοῖς οὖσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, ἔσται τι τῆς ἀγαθότητος κρεῖσσον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐφῆκον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης αἰτίας.

For if all things proceed from a single cause, that cause must be called either the Good or something higher than the Good. But if it is higher than the Good, does anything come from it too into beings and into the nature of beings, or nothing? And if nothing, that is absurd; for we would no longer be keeping it in the rank of a cause, since in every case something must be present to the things caused from the cause, and especially from the very first cause, on which all things depend and through which each of the beings is. But if there is a participation in it as well for those beings, just as there is of the Good, then there will be in beings something better than goodness, come down from the very first cause.

Thomas's comparandum for the FIRST SENTENCE of LdC 8 (Bardenhewer: 'Zu dem ersten Satze vergleicht Thomas die 12. These des Lehrbuches'). LdC 8 has NO source in the Elements — Bardenhewer states flatly '§ 8 findet sich in dieser Fassung in dem Lehrbuche nicht' and calls it a short précis of the book's own system. So on the LdC 8 crux page, El. 12 and El. 180 are comparanda supplied by Aquinas, not ancestors, and the page says so. Creuzer prints δέον πανταχοῦ παρεῖναί τι τοῖς αἰτίοις ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας, where the sense requires the things caused (αἰτιατοῖς) rather than the causal things (αἰτίοις); the English renders the sense as Creuzer's own facing Latin takes it, 'to the things caused', and does not emend the Greek. Creuzer likewise prints ἐκ τῆς πρωτίσης for πρωτίστης a line later, an obvious typographic slip left standing in the Greek.

Apparatus

(1) [p.20] In Ed. est asteriscus, et in margine Scholion legitur: Ἀριστοτελικῶς διὰ τὸ ζ΄. i. e. Haec dicuntur Aristotelice propter ea, quae supra sect. 7 disputantur. Tu confer Aristotelis Analytica poster. I. 7. p. 210 sq.; ibid II. 17. p. 265. Metaphys. II. 2 p. 34 sqq. Sylburgii.
(2) [p.20] A. novum caput incipit: ιβ. Πᾶν γὰρ τό.

Numbered ιβ΄ in Creuzer's edition. · Only the lemma and the opening movement of the proof are given here; the proof continues past p.22.

Edition: Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: none
Translator: Wroot Press draft

ProclusElements of Theologyel.180comparison

Thomas's second comparandum, adduced for the section's account of how an intelligence knows singly what is above and below it. Again a parallel of Thomas's making, not a source of the Latin.

prop 180 · creuzer page 270

PropositionΠᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστὰς ἕκαστος, καὶ ἥνωται τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ διακέκριται ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν.

PropositionEvery intellect is a whole, in that each has its hypostasis out of parts, and is unified with the others, and is distinguished from them.

Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς ἁπλῶς ὅλος, ὡς τὰ μέρη πάντα ὁλικῶς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν δὲ μερικῶν ἕκαστος, ὡς ἐν μέρει τὸ ὅλον ἔχει. Καὶ οὕτω πάντα ἐστὶ μερικῶς· εἰ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἓν πάντα, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν, ἢ μερικῶς, τὸ ἄρα ὅλον οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων μερικῶς, καθ᾽ ἕν τι τῶν μερικῶν, ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἀφοριζόμενον.

But the unparticipated intellect is a whole without qualification, since it holds all the parts in itself in the manner of a whole; whereas each of the particular intellects holds the whole in a part. And in this way it is all things particularly. For if it is all things singly, and to be singly is nothing other than to be particularly, then the whole is present in each of these in that way, particularly — according to some one of the particular characters, which prevails among them all and marks it off.

Bardenhewer cites this for the closing sentences of LdC 8: 'Zu den Schluss-Sätzen vergleiche man These 180.' LdC 8 has no direct source in the Elements (see el.12), so 180 and 12 are comparanda rather than ancestors — the LdC 8 crux says so on its face rather than presenting either as the source. καθ᾽ ἕν in the second movement is ambiguous between 'in a single respect' and 'one by one'; the English takes it as 'singly', which is what the equation with μερικῶς ('in a particular way') requires. ἀμέθεκτος is 'unparticipated' per the glossary. Where the proposition ends and its proof begins is set at the end of the first sentence, as for every unit here. Creuzer prints proposition and proof running on, and at this unit the second sentence ('But the unparticipated intellect is a whole without qualification …') could be read as part of the enunciation; it is placed in the proof because it distinguishes the two kinds of intellect rather than stating the proposition's own claim.

Apparatus

(4) Edit. et A. ροθ.

Numbered ρπ΄ in Creuzer's edition.

Edition: Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: none
Translator: Wroot Press draft

Translated and read

Thomas TaylorElements of Theology (in Six Books of Proclus)props. 12, 180 (Theology of Plato vol. 2, 1816)translationnode only

Taylor's English Elements is appended to volume 2 of his Theology of Plato (1816). Its scan OCRs badly and it has not been extracted, so it stands as a node. It is not only a later English version: Creuzer's own apparatus quotes and weighs Taylor, and at El. 201 adopts his reading against both the printed edition and codex A.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Taylor, London, 1816
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: raw

ProclusElements of Theology (Portus's Latin)props. 12, 180 (Hamburg 1618)translationnode only

Portus's Latin Elements is printed in the 1618 Hamburg volume (confirmed from its preface) but has not yet been located within the scan, so it stands as a node. Creuzer's facing Latin is a reworking of Portus and may never be quoted as his.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Aemilius Portus, Hamburg, 1618
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: none

William of MoerbekeElementatio theologica (Latin translation of Proclus's Elements)props. 12, 180translationnode only

William of Moerbeke's Latin Elements (1268) is the version the Latin west read beside the Liber de causis, and is what let Aquinas identify the source. Node only per ruling 6: no public-domain edition of it exists.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: 1268
OCR status: none

What is not here

No Albert block has been located for this section. The volume's own index rerum points at Liber II, tract. II, cap. IV ('Causa prima regit res creatas omnes') as a promising lead; it has not been followed, and nothing is claimed here on the strength of it.
helyatin (Arabic hayūlā, matter) is left exactly as the Latin transliterates it. Bardenhewer spends pp. 247–274 on the word's textual history; no English equivalent has been imposed.

This page is draft — the English on it has not yet been through review.